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       This study uses an econometric approach to evaluate whether structural 
reforms in Latin America contributed to poverty and income inequality over the 
period from 1985 to 2000.  Data on structural reforms is employed from the Inter-
American Development Bank‟s Structural Policy Index, and poverty and income 
inequality data is obtained from the World Bank‟s PovcalNet database.  Using a 
panel data analysis with controls for GDP per-capita and political institutions, the 
overall openness level is found to be significantly positively related to the percent 
of the population living under the poverty line, the poverty gap, the Gini 
coefficient, the income ratio of the richest to poorest deciles of the population, and 
the mean log deviation.  Specific reforms that are significantly positively related to 
poverty and/or inequality include privatizations and financial deregulation.  Trade 
liberalization, average income, and democratic institutions demonstrate a negative, 




       The author would like to thank Robert McNown, Joseph Jupille, the 
commentators at the Rocky Mountain Interdisciplinary History Conference (2006), 
and the reviewers for their suggestions.  The author would also like to express 




 In Latin America and the Caribbean (LA), countries adopted major structural 
reforms to their economies beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the 
1990s.  These actions were prompted by serious fiscal problems and encouraged by 
international scholars and policy-makers as a pathway towards prosperity.  
Unfortunately, output growth per-capita in LA during these two decades averaged -
0.1% and 1.2% annually, compared with 2.4% and 3.3% during the 1960s and 
1970s.1  Furthermore, from 1980 to 2000, the poverty rate increased from 40.5% to 
42.5%,2 and income inequality expanded.3  Increasing frustration with the reforms 
led many to criticize this approach to growth.  It remains to be answered: Did free-
market reforms contribute to higher poverty and income inequality in LA during this 
period?  What were the impacts of specific reforms and what other factors should be 
considered in evaluating these relationships? 
 Structural reforms, or structural adjustments, involve the liberalization of 
trade and finance, the rebalancing of the tax code, the privatization of state 
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industries, and the deregulation of the labor market.  Examples of these reforms 
include: the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the removal of restrictions to 
foreign direct investment (FDI), the adoption of variable exchange-rate mechanisms, 
the reduction of income taxes, and the implementation of flexible labor contracts.4  
These reforms are expressions of neoliberalism: “the return to the rule of the market, 
the cutback of the state and of social policies, and the liberation of entrepreneurial 
energies.”5  
 
 This study employs an econometric approach to evaluate the relationship 
between three categories of structural reforms (trade, financial, and privatization) and 
five measures of poverty and income inequality (poverty rate, poverty gap, Gini 
index, income ratio of top and bottom deciles, and mean log deviation) in LA over 
the period from 1985 to 2000.  The model controls for average income and political 
institutions, factors that have been shown to affect the extent of poverty and 
inequality.  Special attention is given to data quality and econometric problems that 
have limited previous studies on this topic.  The results suggest that privatizations 
increased poverty and income inequality and that financial deregulation expanded 
income inequality in LA during this period.  In contrast, trade liberalization may have 
reduced poverty.  Countries with higher average incomes and more democratic 
institutions experienced less poverty and income inequality. 
 
 LA is a region that aggressively pursued structural reforms during the 1980s 
and 1990s, yet growth moderated and poverty and income inequality grew during 
this period.  The experience of LA contrasts sharply with that of South and East 
Asia, where poverty decreased from 51.5% to 31.3% and 57.7% to 14.9%, 
respectively.6  In response to popular opposition to the reforms, LA governments are 
reviewing their approaches to development.  A more conclusive understanding of 
the connection between reforms and poverty and inequality is therefore needed.  
This study seeks to add to the discussion by analyzing the most complete data for the 
period, using a model with both economic and political variables, and applying a 
large range of econometric tests.  The results underscore the need for a more 
equitable approach to economic growth. 
 
2. Structural Reforms and Their Consequences 
 
 The three categories of structural reforms that may have the strongest 
relationship to poverty and income inequality (henceforth „inequality‟) are trade and 
financial deregulation, and privatizations.  Financial liberalization means the lowering 
of reserve requirements (% of deposits banks cannot loan out), as well as the 
removal of interest-rate ceilings, barriers to entry into the financial sector, and other 
capital controls.  The intent of these reforms was to expand the availability of 
consumer and business financing and attract foreign capital.7  More FDI and fewer 
restrictions on capital should improve financing for infrastructure projects, 
businesses, and consumers – all of which contribute to economic growth and, by 
extension, lower poverty.  On the other hand, the free movement of capital across 
national borders makes countries vulnerable to a dangerous scenario in which 
negative signals trigger an exodus of capital.  A „sudden stop‟ of capital inflows 
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contributed to the devastating economic crisis that hit Argentina in 2000: over a 
period of three years, the poverty rate increased by 20%.8 
 
 Free trade would be expected to improve the welfare of society by allowing 
countries to specialize in the production of goods in which they have a competitive 
advantage.  Consumers benefit when costly domestic goods are replaced by cheaper 
imports, thereby raising real incomes and lowering poverty.  However, the 
elimination of trade and tariff barriers exposes domestic industries to increased 
competition and, hence, short-term unemployment and depressed wages while the 
economy adjusts to the new environment.9  Modern theories of trade taking into 
account capital mobility through FDI can also explain increasing inequality.  When 
corporations set up operations in a developing country, they have strong demand for 
skilled workers who are in short supply.  This leads to a skill premium and can 
account for an increase in inequality.  It follows that the benefits of trade are 
unequally distributed and can create poverty and inequality even while the average 
income is rising. 
 
 Privatization involves the sale of state enterprises.  Following privatization, 
workforces are usually downsized to improve efficiency.10  This eventually translates 
into greater output if workers can find other jobs; however, the immediate effect is 
more unemployment, poverty, and inequality.  Furthermore, there is the potential for 
corruption in the privatization process when public assets are sold to private 
consortiums at liquidation prices.  Salazar and Pinto explain that, in Chile, the 
reduction of public employees from 308,000 in 1973 to 130,000 in 1982 helped push 
the unemployment rate to over 25% by the end of that period.11  Furthermore, by 
1979, ownership of 70% of traded companies was concentrated into the hands of 
only ten conglomerates. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
 
 There is little empirical evidence regarding the impact of these and other 
reforms on poverty and inequality.  The majority of papers on structural reforms 
only evaluate their impact on economic growth.  This literature will not be discussed 
here, but it is worth mentioning that the meta-analysis of Correa indicates that none 
of the reforms he analyzes has a robust positive relation to growth in LA.12  The 
literature that directly evaluates the link between reforms and poverty/inequality in 
LA includes some recent country studies {Loayza, 2008 (Peru); LeClech, 2007 
(Argentina); Moncayo and Garza, 2006 (Colombia); and Spatz, 2006 (Bolivia)} and a 
computable generalized equilibrium (CGE) model for all LA.13  The results of the 
country studies are contradictory and hard to generalize.  The major fallback of CGE 
models is that the results are sensitive to how the reforms are assumed to travel 
through the economy. 
 
 Szekely, Edwards, and Easterly pursue more straightforward statistical tests.  
Szekely employs a database of 94 household surveys covering 17 LA countries over 
the period from 1977 to 2000.  He also uses the Structural Policy Index (SPI) of the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to evaluate the link between structural 
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reforms and poverty and inequality.  The SPI is widely-used in evaluating the growth 
implications of structural reforms, including the meta-analysis mentioned above.  
The SPI is the average of five sub-indices: trade, finance, tax, privatization, and labor.  
Each sub-index is the average of several policy measures, normalized relative to their 
highest and lowest values.  Szekely utilizes the trade and financial indices and the 
average of the other three indices over the period from 1970 to 1995 with a four-year 
lag. 
 
 The estimation strategy involves a pooling model which, by combining 
observations across countries and years, gives Szekely 75 observations on the 
reforms and measures of poverty/inequality including: the percentage of people 
living under $2 a day, the poverty gap (the average distance below the poverty line), 
and the log income ratio of the richest to poorest deciles.  Using ordinary least-
squares (OLS) estimation (fitting a line to the data by minimizing the squared 
deviations of each observation) and standard significance tests, he concludes that 
“…except for financial sector reform, the economic reforms of the last two decades 
have not contributed to increased poverty and inequality.”14 
 
 Edwards asks whether more open countries have greater inequality.  He uses 
a World Bank (WB) dataset on income distribution that covers 77 countries.  His 
inequality measures are the change in the average Gini coefficient between the 1970s 
and 1980s, and the decade-to-decade change in the poorest quintile‟s share of total 
income.  The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality ranging from 0 (everyone 
has an equal income) to 1 (one person has all of the income).  The openness 
indicators he uses include average tariffs, the WB index of outward orientation, 
Wolf‟s index of import outward orientation, and average black market premium.  
The WB index of outward orientation is a relatively subjective measure of whether a 
country is “open” or “closed.”  Wolf‟s index identifies trade restrictions as deviations 
in production-factor trade intensity from their predicted values.  Finally, the black 
market premium captures the extent of government intervention in the goods 
market. 
 
 Using these multiple openness indicators, Edwards classifies LA countries as 
„reformers‟ or „non-reformers.‟  His estimation involves a simple OLS regression of 
the change in the inequality measures on the reformer dummy and other controls, 
including growth and inflation rates.  Based on a final sample of 44 countries, 
Edwards concludes that there is no indication that trade liberalization is associated 
with increases in inequality.15 
 
 Easterly investigates how growth affects the poor in countries with many 
adjustment loans (loans contingent on structural reform) as opposed to countries 
with few adjustment loans, with less attention to the direct effect of the loans on 
poverty.  The literature on the elasticity of poverty and inequality with respect to 
growth is interesting and will be returned to later.  Nonetheless, Easterly‟s estimation 
strategy does permit the estimation of the marginal effect of structural adjustment 
loans on poverty. 
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 Like Edwards‟ study, this one is cross-sectional and covers all countries for 
which data are available (65 in this case).  It spans the period from 1980 to 1998 and 
the structural reform indicator is the average number of new WB or International 
Monetary Fund adjustment loans per year.  The poverty data is based on household 
surveys compiled by Ravallion and Chen in 1997.  The measure used is the log rate 
of annual change in the percent of the population living below $2 a day.  The results 
indicate that adjustment loans increase the average poverty rate; however, in 
countries with many loans, poverty rates are relatively higher during economic 
expansion and lower during contraction.16 
 
 These three studies provide some suggestive results about the relationship 
between structural reforms and poverty/inequality.  Szekely concludes that financial 
reform over the period from 1970 to 1995 in LA was responsible for the higher 
poverty and inequality observed from 1974 to 1999.  Edwards and Easterly evaluate 
the impact of the reforms on a global scale.  Edwards was unable to find any 
relationship between trade reforms and inequality between the 1970s and 1980s.  
Easterly confirms that structural adjustment loans did not reduce poverty (they 
increased it) over the period from 1980 to 1998. 
 
 These results are interesting but not conclusive and only Szekely‟s results are 
specific to LA.  Two major limitations of the research on this subject are the absence 
of data and the imprecision of the structural reform measures.  Poverty and 
inequality data are derived from a common base of household surveys that covers 
only 25% of potential country-year observations.  By stacking the data for LA, 
Szekely has a total of 75 observations out of potentially about 400.  Edwards avoids 
the mismatch of poverty-inequality and reform data by using the percentage change 
in the average of each variable by decade, leaving only 44 observations across all 
countries.  Easterly has a panel covering all countries across 19 years with only 126 
observations (out of potentially thousands).  The measures of structural reforms vary 
considerably.  The SPI – a scale of openness based on multiple policy measures – is 
more precise than the reformer/non-reformer dummy of Edwards or the loan-count 
of Easterly.  Given the small sample sizes and unlike reform measures, the inability 
to find a significant relationship doesn‟t mean there isn‟t one. 
 
 This paper will take an econometric approach closer to that of Szekely.  It 
will employ the overall SPI and three sub-indices (financial, trade, privatizations) as 
the indicators of structural reforms.  Other improvements include more complete 
poverty and inequality data and another five years of structural reform data (20% 
more observations overall).  Furthermore, the model will control for variation in 
average income and political institutions, and will offer a range of tests that deal with 
major econometric problems.  Over seven years have passed since those studies were 
completed.  It will be useful to re-evaluate the previous findings and potentially 
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4. Income, Institutions and Poverty/Inequality 
 
 Determinants of poverty and inequality are so numerous that it is impossible 
to consider them all in any study.  The theoretical literature suggests that two  
factors – average income and political institutions – have the greatest impact. 
 
 Average income, measured by per-capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product), 
varies substantially across LA countries.  In countries where the average person has a 
higher income, one would expect less poverty, all-else-equal.  The average income 
tells us nothing about the distribution of that income, though.  Now, consider the 
growth rate of average income.  If average income grows, poverty should also 
decline as long as the poor enjoy a fraction of that growth.  The growth rate does 
have direct implications for inequality.  If all groups see the same percentage increase 
in income, for instance, inequality grows because the poor earn less. 
 
 The link between the level of per-capita income and its growth rate with 
poverty and inequality has been quantified for LA over this period.  Easterly 
estimates that the growth elasticity of poverty – the percentage change in poverty in 
response to a given percentage change in growth – is negative.17  This is confirmed 
by Szekely, who also finds a significant positive growth elasticity of inequality.18  In 
general, the literature holds that growth leads to less poverty, but not necessarily 
more inequality.19  The differential effects of average income and its growth rate 
must be considered when estimating the direct effect of the reforms on poverty or 
inequality. 
 
 Political institutions are cited as the second most important factor explaining 
the extent of poverty and inequality.  Democratic institutions correspond to greater 
spending on public goods; authoritarian institutions, on the contrary, encourage rent-
seeking behavior.20  LA has a history of unrepresentative and authoritarian 
governments that may have contributed to poverty and inequality.  The fact that 
many military dictatorships were in power in LA at the same time that liberalization 
occurred is a coincidence that should not be overlooked.  It is critical to consider 
whether structural reforms had an impact on poverty and inequality aside from that 




The connection between structural reforms and poverty/inequality in LA will 
be evaluated using a sample of 19 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela) during the period from 1985-2000. 
 
 The data on poverty and inequality was obtained from the PovcalNet 
database created by the WB Development Research Group.21  The methodology 
employed is described by Chen and Ravallion.  They combined new and existing  
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survey data and recalculated all of the poverty and inequality measures using 
consistent criteria.  The authors are critical of research that relies on multiple sources 
of data and state that the WB data are consistent and reliable back to 1981.22  The 
poverty and inequality indicators which will be used here are the “percent of 
population living in households with consumption or income per person below the 
poverty line,” the poverty gap, the Gini index, the log income ratio of the richest to 
poorest deciles of the population, and the mean log deviation (the average difference 
between the log average income and log individual income). 
 
 The measures of structural reforms will be the overall SPI and three sub-
indices (trade, financial, and privatizations).  Each index ranges from zero to one: the 
closer to one, the more “open” the country.  Data on per-capita purchasing-power-
parity (PPP) GDP (in constant 2000 U$D) and the growth rate of GDP were 
obtained from the WB.23  The PPP adjustment accounts for the ability to purchase 
goods and services and not just income.  The type of political regime is represented 
by the POLITY index (Version IV), which is equal to the difference between the 
sub-indices institutionalized democracy and autocracy.  It is coded annually based on 
multiple rankings that capture the extent of political constraints and competitive 
participation.  Its values range from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly 
autocratic).  The descriptive statistics are shown in Table I. 
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The statistics in the first column of Table I are for all annual data and in the third 
column, for the data when observations are averaged across five reference periods 
(1986-1988, 1989-1991, 1992-1994, 1995-1997, and 1998-2000).  The reference-year 
grouping is appropriate because most countries only collected poverty/inequality 
data once every three years (very few observations are lost).  The observations for 
the reforms, polity, and GDP are lagged one year to allow for a delayed effect on 
poverty/inequality.  The number of observations in each case is presented in 
columns two and four.  For the survey-year data, there are 19 cross-sections and 15 
time periods (1985-1999), giving a maximum of 285 observations.  For the reference-
year data, there are also 19 cross-sections but only five periods of time, a maximum 
of 95 observations. 
 
It is important to note that the poverty line Chen and Ravallion use to calculate the 
poverty rate is only $1.08 a day (in 1993 PPP).  Very few people live below this level 
in developed countries but in LA, an average 11% of the population is in „extreme 
poverty.‟  The average poverty gap of 4.1 indicates that the average poor person is 
living on substantially less than $1 a day.  The three inequality indicators reflect a 
wide disparity of wealth.  With an average Gini coefficient of 51, LA is the most 
unequal region in the world.  The means of the reform indices indicate relatively high 
levels of trade and financial openness, but a low degree of privatization.  The 
political institutions are generally democratic (6.6 on a scale of -10 to +10) and the 
average income ($4,696) falls within the range of low- to middle income countries.  
The average growth rate of 3% seems high because it is not adjusted for population 
growth or changes in purchasing power.  The scatterplot of the average SPI index on 
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5.  Estimation 
 
 There are many econometric problems in estimating the relationship between 
economic reforms and poverty/inequality.  For one, LA is very dependent on 
international factors, such as interest rates and export demand, that may cause 
poverty and inequality spells.  Second, there is the risk of a spurious correlation – 
poverty/inequality and openness may be unrelated but still both increase over time 
through some unidentified process.  Both of these issues will be addressed.  With a 
pooling model (where one stacks the observations across countries and time periods) 
there are more degrees of freedom (more observations relative to parameters being 
estimated) and methods of dealing with these problems. 
 
 Equation (1) is the basic model with a single intercept term β0.  The i and t 
subscripts indicate the country and the time period, respectively.  The variables are as 
follows: poverty or inequality indicator (POV/INEQ), financial (FIN), trade (TRD), 
and privatization (PRIV) reform components of the SPI, POLITY rankings (POL), 
and GDP per capita (GDP). 
 
(1) POV/INEQit = β0
 + β1FINit-1 + β2TRDit-1 + β3PRIVit-1 + β4POLit-1 + 
β5GDPit-1 + εit 
 
Equation (1) will also be estimated with the overall SPI replacing the three sub-
indices (FIN, TRD, PRIV).  This is by no means a comprehensive set of controls, 
but given the relatively low number of observations and the high correlations 
between other macroeconomic measures (like inflation) mentioned in the literature, 
the model employs the available variation while introducing the least amount of bias. 
 
 The theory discussed earlier suggests opposing effects of each reform on 
poverty and inequality.  The best evidence indicates that only financial reform has a 
notable effect on inequality and, to a lesser extent, poverty.  The net effect of trade 
should be a reduction in poverty but an increase in inequality.  Privatization is 
thought to be positively related to both indicators, but there is little evidence so far.  
Finally, more democratic regimes and higher average incomes should be associated 
with less poverty.  Some evidence suggests that democracy encourages equality, while 
faster growth creates inequality. 
 
 In order to control for all time-invariant characteristics that differ between 
cross-sections, equation (1) may be estimated using fixed effects, in which a dummy 
variable is added for each country.  Fixed-effects estimation captures the within-
group variation while controlling for everything else, including language, legal origin, 
racial composition, geography, climate, etc.  A modified Wald-Test indicates that 
using fixed effects is a significant improvement to the model24. 
 
 Given data limitations, it would be better to use a model of random effects 
and avoid estimating the coefficients on 19 dummy variables.  The random effects 
estimator employs the variation within each country, but also between countries.  It 
recognizes that the many factors not included in the model are correlated across  




countries and accordingly, weighs the observations.  The only way to use the random 
effects model is for the random effects to be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables.  The Hausman test indicates that there are no significant biases due to 
unobserved heterogeneity, so the random effects model will be adopted.25  The 
results are presented in Tables II and III for the poverty and inequality measures, 
respectively.  The results are generally robust when using OLS or fixed-effects 
estimation (not shown). 
 
 The results in columns one and three of Table II show that the overall SPI, 
or level of openness, is positively related to poverty, as measured by extreme poverty 
or the poverty gap.  The coefficients on POLITY and per-capita GDP are negative, 
as hypothesized, although only GDP is significant.  The results in columns two and 
four show that privatizations are positively related to both poverty measures, but the 
coefficients on the other two reform indices are insignificant.  The results are 
substantial as well as significant; a country that fully privatizes state industries would 
have 6.6% more people living in extreme poverty compared to a country that does 
no privatizations. 
 
 The results in columns one, three, and five of Table III also suggest a 
positive relationship between overall openness and inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, the income ratio of top-to-bottom deciles, and the mean log deviation.  
Looking at columns two, four, and six, which estimate the model with three types of 
reforms, financial openness is positively related to all three measures of inequality.  
Also, privatizations are positively related to inequality measured by the mean log 
deviation of income.  Across the six specifications, there is no apparent relationship 
between the political and average income variables and inequality. 
Overall Openness Level (SPI) *15.6 *8.6
(6.8) (3.7)
Financial Openness 3.4 1.2
(4.3) (2.3)
Trade Openness -0.9 -0.5
(4.2) (2.3)
Privatization Openness **6.6 *4.6
(4.0) (2.2)
POLITY Ranking -0.39 -0.41 -0.11 -0.12
(0.26) (0.26) (0.14) (0.14)
Per-Capita PPP GDP *-0.0017 *-0.0015 *-0.0008 *-0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003)
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18
Number of Observations 90 90 90 90
†
Standard errors are in parentheses; *significant at 5% level, **significant at 10% level.
Table II. Regression Results - Survey Year - Poverty Indicators
†
Poverty GapPoverty Line




 One potential source of bias in the above estimates is autocorrelation (values 
of the variables in previous periods may be influencing their values in subsequent 
periods).  To allow for this possibility, the model can be estimated with a correction 
for first-order autocorrelation.  However, the lack of consecutive observations across 
periods in this sample prohibits the use of this process.  To overcome this barrier, 
the data are organized according to the five reference years suggested by PovCal.Net: 
1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, and 1999.  The data for the other explanatory variables are 
averaged across the three preceding years to allow for a small lag in policy 
transmission.  To use this correction, fixed effects estimation is required, but this is 
suitable since the fixed and random effects estimates don‟t significantly differ.  The 
major drawback is that the observations for the first period are dropped. 
 
 The results for the estimation of equation (1) using fixed effects with an 
AR(1) correction are shown in Tables IV and V.  Again, the results are also 
presented with the overall SPI in place of the three separate reform indices.  In 
addition, these specifications include a control for GDP growth rates instead of per-
capita levels (this does not substantially change the results).  Theory suggests that 
faster economic growth may decrease poverty but increase inequality; the impact of 
the level of per-capita income on poverty and inequality is more ambiguous. 
 
Overall Openness Level (SPI) *12.9 *11.9 *0.37
(5.2) (4.9) (0.11)
Financial Openness *6.4 *7.5 *0.14
(3.2) (3.0) (0.07)
Trade Openness -1.8 -2.1 -0.04
(3.1) (2.9) (0.07)
Privatization Openness 3.4 1.9 *0.13
(3.0) (2.8) (0.06)
POLITY Ranking 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.002 0.001
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.004) (0.004)
Per-Capita PPP GDP -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.00001 -0.00001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.00001) (0.00001)
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.27 0.29 0.17 0.20
Number of Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90
†
Standard errors are in parentheses; *significant at 5% level, **significant at 10% level.
GINI Index Income Difference Between Top 
and Bottom Deciles
Mean Log Deviation
Table III. Regression Results - Survey Year - Inequality Indicators




 As with the random-effects model, the results from the fixed-effects model 
with the correction for autocorrelation in Table IV identifies a positive relationship 
between the overall level of openness and privatizations with both poverty 
indicators; indeed, the magnitude of the relationship is greater.  The coefficients on 
GDP are still negative, but cease to be significant in some cases.  Interestingly, by 
using GDP rates instead of levels, trade liberalization becomes significantly 
negatively related to both poverty indicators when using fixed effects without the AR 
term (not reported).  Similarly, without the autoregressive process, democratic 
institutions are negatively related to poverty. 
 
 The results for the inequality measures shown in Table V also strengthen the 
findings from the random-effects model.  The SPI and financial openness are still 
positively related to all three measures of inequality, and the coefficient on SPI is 
larger.  The new finding is that privatizations are also positively related to all three 
inequality indicators (the earlier result was limited to mean log deviation).  Again, 
institutions and GDP do not reveal any significant connection with inequality. 
 
 The results from the reference-year grouping with fixed-effects and a 
correction for autocorrelation confirm the results obtained from the previous panel.  
Specifically, financial reforms may cause inequality, and privatizations may lead to 
both greater poverty and inequality.  The overall degree of policy openness, the SPI, 
is robustly connected with both increased poverty and inequality.  Consistent with 
previous evidence, it appears that free trade is poverty-reducing.  The evidence on 
the impact of higher average incomes and more democratic institutions is 
ambiguous; in some cases they seem to decrease poverty and inequality, but the 
analysis with the AR term indicates that these processes are path-dependent and not 
necessarily causally-related. 
 
Overall Openness Level (SPI) *23.7 *16.2
(8.8) (6.5)
Financial Openness -1.2 0.1
(3.7) (2.1)
Trade Openness -1.6 -2.6
(4.5) (2.9)
Privatization Openness *15.1 *10.4
(3.3) (1.9)
POLITY Ranking 0.23 -0.18 0.31 0.01
(0.67) (0.43) (0.30) (0.30)
GDP Growth Rate -0.22 -0.07 **-0.19 -0.01
(0.22) (0.21) (0.10) (0.11)
AR(1) 0.20 -0.09 *0.48 0.07
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
R-squared 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.93
Number of Observations 59 59 59 59
†
Standard errors are in parentheses; *significant at 5% level, **significant at 10% level.
Table IV. Regression Results - Reference Year - Poverty Indicators
†
Poverty Line Poverty Gap




6.  Conclusion 
 
 Previous studies that have evaluated the relationship between structural 
reforms and poverty or inequality were challenged by a lack of data and imprecise 
measures of reform.  This study uses comprehensive indicators of structural policy 
and the most complete and consistent poverty and inequality data available.  The 
model is simple but powerful because it controls for average income and institutions.  
In support of some results by Szekely and Easterly, yet contrary to those of 
Edwards, this paper finds that the Inter-American Development Bank‟s overall 
openness index is positively related to both poverty and inequality.  Moreover, the 
financial openness sub-index is positively related to inequality, and the privatizations 
sub-index is positively related to both poverty and inequality.  These results hold 
when using three different estimators, different controls, and a correction for 
autocorrelation.  The results fail to discredit the argument that trade liberalization, 
average income, and democracy are negatively related to poverty and inequality. 
 
 Debate is spirited in academic and political circles concerning the effects of 
recent neo-liberal policies, yet there is little empirical work that has resolved this 
question.  This study seeks to fill that void and concludes that there is reason to be 
critical of globalization.  Structural reforms, in general, and financial deregulation and 
privatization, in particular, were regressive policies.  On the contrary, trade 
liberalization may have benefited the poor.  This is not to say to say that the reforms 
should not have been made, only that they had some undesirable consequences in 
the short-term.  Further work is needed to understand how economic growth and 
institutions interact to affect the poor.  One thing is certain: a more equitable 
approach to development will likely characterize future reforms given Latin 
America‟s disappointing recent history.
Overall Openness Level (SPI) *24.9 *20.0 *0.67
(6.5) (5.6) 0.17
Financial Openness *6.6 *7.2 **0.13
(3.2) (3.0) 0.07
Trade Openness -2.2 -2.4 -0.07
(4.5) (4.1) 0.10
Privatization Openness *8.3 **5.1 *0.27
(2.9) (2.7) 0.06
POLITY Ranking 0.17 -0.04 0.29 0.04 0.005 0.0001
(0.51) (0.48) (0.45) (0.43) (0.012) (0.0114)
GDP Growth Rate -0.15 -0.07 -0.14 -0.09 -0.004 -0.001
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.004) (0.004)
AR(1) 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.04 *0.30 0.15
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.92
Number of Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59
†
Standard errors are in parentheses; *significant at 5% level, **significant at 10% level.
GINI Index
Income Difference Between Top 
and Bottom Deciles
Mean Log Deviation
Table V. Regression Results - Reference Year - Inequality Indicators
†
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